Industrial Spy data extortion market gets into the ransomware game The Industrial Spy data extortion marketplace has now launched its own ransomware operation, where they now also encrypt victim's devices. Last month, we reported on a new data extortion marketplace called Industrial Spy that allowed threat actors, and possibly even business competitors, to purchase data stolen from companies. This marketplace sells different types of stolen data, ranging from selling 'premium' data for millions of dollars to individual files for as little as $2. Top Articles READ MORE READ MORE Industrial Spy's premium stolen data category Source: BleepingComputer To promote their service, the threat actors partnered with adware loaders and fake crack sites to distribute malware that would create README.txt files on a device. The threat actors used these files to promote their marketplace, explaining that readers can purchase schemes, drawings, technologies, political and military secrets, accounting reports, and client databases of their competitors. Industrial Spy gets into the ransomware game Last week, security researcher MalwareHunterTeam found a new sample of the Industrial Spy malware with what looked more like a ransom note rather than a promotional text file. This ransom note now states that the Industrial Spy threat actors not only stole the victim's data but also encrypted it. "Unfortunately we have to report you that your company was compromised. All your files were encrypted and you can't restore them without our private key. Trying to restore it without our help may cause complete loss of your data," reads the Industrial Spy ransom note shared below. "Also we researched whole your corporate network and downloaded all your sensitive data to our servers. If we will not get any contact from you in 3 next days we will publish your data on the site 'Industrial Spy Market'." Industrial Spy ransom note Source: BleepingComputer MalwareHunterTeam shared the malware sample with BleepingComputer to confirm if it encrypted files as it said. BleepingComputer's tests showed that the Industrial Spy ransomware does indeed encrypt files, but unlike most other ransomware families, does not append a new extension to encrypted file's names, as shown below. File encrypted by the Industrial Spy Ransomware Source: BleepingComputer BleepingComputer also shared the sample with ransomware expert Michael Gillespie, who said from a glance that he believes that it uses DES encryption, with the key encrypted using an RSA1024 public key. The ransomware also uses a filemarker of 0xFEEDBEEF, which we have not seen before in a ransomware family. However, this filemarker should not be confused with 0xDEADBEEF; a well-known magic debug value used in programming. While encrypting files, the Industrial Spy ransomware will create the above ransom note named 'README.html' in every folder on the device. These ransom notes contain a TOX id that victims can use to contact the ransomware gang and negotiate a ransom. A tie to Cuba ransomware? When researching the TOX ID and email address found in the ransom note, MalwareHunterTeam discovered a strange connection to the Cuba ransomware operation. A ransomware sample uploaded to VirusTotal creates a ransom note with an identical TOX ID and email address. However, instead of linking to the Industrial Spy Tor site, it links to Cuba Ransomware's data leak site and uses the same file name, !! READ ME ! !.txt, as known Cuba ransom notes. Ransom note linking to Cuba data leak site Source: BleepingComputer Furthermore, the encrypted files have the .cuba extension appended to them, just like the regular Cuba ransomware operation does when encrypting files. While this does not 100% tie the two groups together, it's very possible that the Industrial Spy threat actors simply used Cuba's information while testing the creation of their ransomware. However, it is peculiar and something that security researchers and analysts will need to keep an eye on.

Researchers Find Potential Way to Run Malware on iPhone Even When it's OFF A first-of-its-kind security analysis of iOS Find My function has identified a novel attack surface that makes it possible to tamper with the firmware and load malware onto a Bluetooth chip that's executed while an iPhone is "off." The mechanism takes advantage of the fact that wireless chips related to Bluetooth, Near-field communication (NFC), and ultra-wideband (UWB) continue to operate while iOS is shut down when entering a "power reserve" Low Power Mode (LPM). While this is done so as to enable features like Find My and facilitate Express Card transactions, all the three wireless chips have direct access to the secure element, academics from the Secure Mobile Networking Lab (SEEMOO) at the Technical University of Darmstadt said in a paper. "The Bluetooth and UWB chips are hardwired to the Secure Element (SE) in the NFC chip, storing secrets that should be available in LPM," the researchers said. "Since LPM support is implemented in hardware, it cannot be removed by changing software components. As a result, on modern iPhones, wireless chips can no longer be trusted to be turned off after shutdown. This poses a new threat model." The findings are set to be presented at the ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (WiSec 2022) this week. The LPM features, newly introduced last year with iOS 15, make it possible to track lost devices using the Find My network even when run out of battery power or have been shut off. Current devices with Ultra-wideband support include iPhone 11, iPhone 12, and iPhone 13. A message displayed when turning off iPhones reads thus: "iPhone remains findable after power off. Find My helps you locate this iPhone when it is lost or stolen, even when it is in power reserve mode or when powered off." Calling the current LPM implementation "opaque," the researchers not only sometimes observed failures when initializing Find My advertisements during power off, effectively contradicting the aforementioned message, they also found that the Bluetooth firmware is neither signed nor encrypted. By taking advantage of this loophole, an adversary with privileged access can create malware that's capable of being executed on an iPhone Bluetooth chip even when it's powered off. However, for such a firmware compromise to happen, the attacker must be able to communicate to the firmware via the operating system, modify the firmware image, or gain code execution on an LPM-enabled chip over-the-air by exploiting flaws such as BrakTooth. Put differently, the idea is to alter the LPM application thread to embed malware, such as those that could alert the malicious actor of a victim's Find My Bluetooth broadcasts, enabling the threat actor to keep remote tabs on the target. "Instead of changing existing functionality, they could also add completely new features," SEEMOO researchers pointed out, adding they responsibly disclosed all the issues to Apple, but that the tech giant "had no feedback." With LPM-related features taking a more stealthier approach to carrying out its intended use cases, SEEMOO called on Apple to include a hardware-based switch to disconnect the battery so as to alleviate any surveillance concerns that could arise out of firmware-level attacks. "Since LPM support is based on the iPhone's hardware, it cannot be removed with system updates," the researchers said. "Thus, it has a long-lasting effect on the overall iOS security model." "Design of LPM features seems to be mostly driven by functionality, without considering threats outside of the intended applications. Find My after power off turns shutdown iPhones into tracking devices by design, and the implementation within the Bluetooth firmware is not secured against manipulation."