Meaning in Life & the Illusion of Free Will (Derk Pereboom)
Are human actions freely chosen? Can we deserve blame and praise for what we do? The common sense answer to both of these questions is yes. But this answer is threatened by the fact that our best scientific theories support the view that factors beyond our control produce all of our actions. Derk Pereboom sets out an argument that free will of the sort required for deserved blame and praise is indeed ruled out, but that this does not undermine the core elements of morality, value and meaning in life.
This talk was given by Derk Pereboom in 2010 talk at the University of Alabama as part of the philosophy today lecture series. Pereboom's research areas are in free will and moral responsibility, philosophy of mind, history of modern philosophy and philosophy of religion.
In this first talk, Ken Gemes introduces Nietzsche as the philosopher of the death of God. Nietzsche claims that we have not yet fully understood the ramifications of the modern rejection of belief in God. Giving up the belief in God undermines all our values, though many cling to those values in the absence of God or of any other justificatory basis for those values. When we truly appreciate the meaning of the death of God, we will, says Nietzsche, lapse into nihilism; the inability to find any foundation for values and meaning in the world. This Nietzsche presciently predicts as the future of Europe for the next two hundred years. Nietzsche does not endorse nihilism but seeks to move beyond it to a new affirmation of this world, the one and only world. But what does Nietzsche mean exactly by nihilism? This is discussed in the talk.
00:00 Talk
31:42 Q&A
William James' wonderful 1904 essay "A World of Pure Experience" read by Carl Manchester and from LibriVox. The paper comes from William James' "Essays in Radical Empiricism", which was published posthumously in 1912.
A pretty good introductory talk on personal identity and some of the philosophical issues that arise. The lecturer is Patrick Stokes of Deakin University and was given at the Ethics Centre. This comes from an episode of the podcast The Philosopher's Zone from a few years back titled "Personal identity: a primer".
The lecturer Patrick Stokes: http://www.patrickstokes.com
The Philosopher's Zone: https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/...
The Ethics Centre: http://www.ethics.org.au/home
Quantum mechanics and relativity have shown us that the nature of matter is vastly different than materialists and mechanists ever imagined. Even so, trying to accommodate conscious minds into the natural order has led to the hard problem of consciousness and other seemingly insoluble problems. Indeed, even in the field of consciousness studies more and more researchers in both philosophy and the cognitive neuroscience of consciousness are becoming skeptical that any form of materialism or reductionism can resolve the hard problem of consciousness. The two emerging contenders seem to be strong emergence versus some form of panpsychism. Unfortunately, the terms of the ancient debate between strong emergence and some form of inherence such as panpsychism have not changed very much in the last few hundred years. So we allegedly have conscious agents either inexplicably popping out of brains as in strong emergence or we have something intrinsically experience-like hiding at the metaphysical 'center' of fundamental physical entities inexplicably combining to form mature minds. To see the way out, we must begin by noting that with the exception of conscious experience itself, both views share a physicalist or ontologically reductive framework. On both views, with the exception of consciousness itself, the world is just as physicalism or ontological reductionism says it is. Can we do better? Yes, neutral monism of the sort defended by William James and others is the key. The latter holds that the very idea of mind and matter as essentially distinct in the first place, is the root of the hard problem. Neutral monism deflates the hard problem and allows us to reconceive both matter and mind in a harmonious and naturalistic way, all of which puts meaning back into the heart of nature.
This talk was given by Michael Silberstein in 2015 at Wesleyan University.
00:00 Strong Emergence & Panpsychism
30:09 The Alternative Conception
One of America’s most prominent philosophers says his field has been tilting at windmills for nearly 400 years. Representationalism (or indirect realism)---the idea that we don’t directly perceive external objects in the world, but only our own inner mental images or representations of objects---has bedeviled philosophy ever since Descartes, and now is mucking up neuroscience as well, John Searle alleges. He has long defended the “naive” alternative that our senses do actually give us direct access to external reality, and he fires his latest salvo in his new book “Seeing Things as They Are: A Theory of Perception”. John is well-known for his no nonsense approach to philosophical problems, and there was plenty of straight talk here as he discussed his theory of perception, the subjective-objective divide, the scientific study of consciousness, and his dog Tarski. This interview was given a few years back by Robert Pollie which I quite like from a podcast called the 7th Avenue Project: www.7thavenueproject.com.
Dan Robinson gives the 1st lecture in a series of 8 on Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.
Both sense and reason are limited. Kant must identify the proper mission and domain of each, as well as the manner in which their separate functions come to be integrated in what is finally the inter-subjectively settled knowledge of science.
This series looks at German Philosopher Immanuel Kant's seminal philosophical work 'The Critique of Pure Reason'. The lectures aim to outline and discuss some of the key philosophical issues raised in the book and to offer students and individuals thought provoking Kantian ideas surrounding metaphysics. Each lecture looks at particular questions raised in the work such as how do we know what we know and how do we find out about the world, dissects these questions with reference to Kant's work and discusses the broader philosophical implications. Anyone with an interest in Kant and philosophy will find these lectures thought provoking but accessible.
This is series of lectures was given in 2011 at Oxford. Note, audio has been improved.
Dan Robinson gives the 3rd lecture in a series of 8 on Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.
Kant's so-called "Copernican" revolution in metaphysics begins with the recognition of the observer's contribution to the observation. Thus, to the extent that Hume's empiricism restricts knowledge to experience, empiricism succeeds only by accepting the a priori grounding of experience itself.
This series looks at German Philosopher Immanuel Kant's seminal philosophical work 'The Critique of Pure Reason'. The lectures aim to outline and discuss some of the key philosophical issues raised in the book and to offer students and individuals thought provoking Kantian ideas surrounding metaphysics. Each lecture looks at particular questions raised in the work such as how do we know what we know and how do we find out about the world, dissects these questions with reference to Kant's work and discusses the broader philosophical implications. Anyone with an interest in Kant and philosophy will find these lectures thought provoking but accessible.
This is series of lectures was given in 2011 at Oxford. Note, the audio has been improved.
Donald Davidson discusses his views on epistemology and perception with Michael Martin. Among other things, he discusses the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief, coherentism about truth and knowledge, John McDowell's criticism, the notion of qualia, his rejection of any epistemic intermediary between the world and our beliefs about it, how he can account for perceptual illusions and hallucinations, and his own externalist account of perceptual beliefs and how they are justified.
This is from Philosophy International 1997.