This is a reading of the first chapter of Giovanni Gentile's "Theory of Mind as Pure Act." In this chapter, Gentile presents his standpoints on past issues expressed in idealistic metaphysical systems and sets a course for a unique system of his own. Gentile begins with an important statement as to the existence of a mind-independent, material reality: “Reality is conceivable only insofar as the reality conceived is conceived as being in relation to the activity of a Mind which conceives it, and in that relation it is not only a possible object of knowledge, but a present and actual one. To conceive a reality is to conceive, at the same time and as one with it, a Mind in and for which said reality manifests itself; and therefore the concept of a material reality is absurd....The concept of bodies existing generally outside all Mind, is a self-contradictory concept, since we can only meaningfully speak of things that are either objects of knowledge, or things that are conceived as objects of knowledge; and objects of knowledge are manifestations-to-and-for-Mind; they are ideas....The object, even when thought of as outside all Mind, is always mental….When we believe that we are actually conceiving a reality outside all Mind, we falsify our belief by conceiving of said reality as something which can be meaningfully be spoken of; and when we presume all Mind absent, even then Mind is intervening and powerless to abstain from intervening, in the very act by which we affirm Mind’s absence.” (Gentile, “Teoria Generale Dello Spirito Come Atto Puro,” 1-4) I revised and standardized Gentile’s argument in the following way: P1) No actual, concrete being is conceivable otherwise than as an actual, concrete unity of meaning. P2) But an actual, concrete unity of meaning, logically presupposes an actual, concrete "sense-bestowing" Experience; an Experience which said being is either one with, or, in which and for which, said being has an intentionally constituted, unified, and determinate character. C1) Therefore, no actual, concrete being is conceivable otherwise than as a being which is one with an actual, concrete Experience, or a being which is in and for an actual, concrete Experience. [From P1 and P2] P3) But an actual, concrete being which is one with an actual, concrete Experience is just an actual, concrete Experience, and a being which is in and for an actual, concrete Experience is just a determination thereof. C2) Therefore, no actual, concrete being is conceivable otherwise than as an actual, concrete Experience or a determination thereof. [From C1 and P3] P4) But Reality is actual and concrete—and Reality is not a determination of anything higher than itself; for Reality is self-determined, and has all of its determinations “internal” to itself. C3) Therefore, Reality is conceivable only insofar as Reality is conceived as an actual, concrete Experience. [From C2 and P4] I defend the premises of this argument in my blog post, “My Adaptation of Gentile’s “Conceivability Argument” for Idealism”. Here is a copy of “Theory of Mind as Pure Act:” https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_theory_of_mind_as_pure_act/FzxRAAAAYAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&printsec=frontcover

"We wish to derive a reality that is unconfined in space and unlimited in time from a reality that is limited to a definite portion of space and to a moment of time." This is a reading of Herbert Wildon Carr's classic 1914 article, "Why the Mind Seems to Be, and yet Cannot Be, Produced by the Brain." Heavily influenced by the writings of British Neo-Hegelians and Italian Neo-idealists, as well as the spiritualistic vitalism of Henri Bergson, Carr foreshadows the many difficulties that contemporary physicalist accounts of "consciousness" and "mind" must reconcile with; e.g. intentionality, time-consciousness, the temporal continuity of consciousness, etc. Anyone interested in reading the article may check out the link below: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Why_the_Mind_Seems_to_Be_and_yet_Cannot_Be_Produced_by_the_Brain