USB stick out of package and left in overnight unattended and through the morning.
ARIZONA SECRETARY OF STATE 2019 ELECTIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL Page | 98
In addition, the following security protocols apply to any memory stick or removable electronic storage device used with the electronic voting system: 1. A stick or device must be purchased or received from a reliable source. 2. A stick or device shall be permanently identified with a unique serial number or identifier when in use, and an inventory of all electronic media shall be created and maintained. 3. Electronic storage media shall be physically secured at all times. No physical access should be given to any person unless the election officer in charge of the electronic storage media specifically grants that person access. Secured locations must be provided for storing electronic media when not in use, coding an election, creating the election media, and transferring and installing the election media into the voting device. 4. No electronic storage media shall be left unattended or in an unsecured location once it has been coded for an election. Where applicable, coded election media shall be immediately loaded into the relevant voting device, sealed, logged, and made secure or must be placed in a secured and controlled environment and inventoried. 5. A stick or device should generally not be used to transfer data between an internetconnected system and a non-connected electronic voting system. Only when necessary to import ballot language to the electronic voting system should such transfer occur, and in those circumstances, the internet-connected system and stick or device shall be scanned with updated antivirus software prior to transfer. In addition, the officer in charge of elections shall consider and implement other appropriate security protocols for such data transfers. 6. A stick or device used to transfer data to or from the electronic voting system should only be used one time – to transfer data from one system to a second system and then securely disposed of. When feasible, write-once memory cards or write-once disks should be used instead of USB devices to transfer data to or from an electronic voting system to ensure a “one-way, one-use policy” is self-enforced by the technology. 7. If the individual file to be transferred between systems was electronically received (whether through download, by email, or any other electronic means), the individual file must be scanned with antivirus software prior to being placed on the stick or device. If any files were downloaded from an internet portal, the portal must be a secure portal for data transmission purposes. Regardless of the method of receipt, however, individual files should only be downloaded, transferred, or otherwise utilized if they were received by a trusted third-party source. 8. If a stick or device was received by mail: • The stick or device should only be accepted from a trusted, third-party source;
• The stick or device must be encrypted by the third-party source, and the password to decrypt the stick or device may not be included with the mailing itself; and • Upon receipt, the stick or device must be scanned with antivirus software prior to opening or otherwise executing any file contained on the stick or device.
16-625. Electronic data and digital images; ballots; security
The officer in charge of elections shall ensure that electronic data from and electronic or digital images of ballots are protected from physical and electronic access, including unauthorized copying or transfer, and that all security measures are at least as protective as those prescribed for paper ballots.
16-452. Rules; instructions and procedures manual; approval of manual; field check and review of systems; violation; classification
A. After consultation with each county board of supervisors or other officer in charge of elections, the secretary of state shall prescribe rules to achieve and maintain the maximum degree of correctness, impartiality, uniformity and efficiency on the procedures for early voting and voting, and of producing, distributing, collecting, counting, tabulating and storing ballots. The secretary of state shall also adopt rules regarding fax transmittal of unvoted ballots, ballot requests, voted ballots and other election materials to and from absent uniformed and overseas citizens and shall adopt rules regarding internet receipt of requests for federal postcard applications prescribed by section 16-543.
B. The rules shall be prescribed in an official instructions and procedures manual to be issued not later than December 31 of each odd-numbered year immediately preceding the general election. Before its issuance, the manual shall be approved by the governor and the attorney general. The secretary of state shall submit the manual to the governor and the attorney general not later than October 1 of the year before each general election.
C. A person who violates any rule adopted pursuant to this section is guilty of a class 2 misdemeanor.
D. The secretary of state shall provide personnel who are experts in electronic voting systems and procedures and in electronic voting system security to field check and review electronic voting systems and recommend needed statutory and procedural changes.
ARIZONA SECRETARY OF STATE
2019 ELECTIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL
Components of the electronic voting system:
1. Must be password-protected (for voting system software);
• In addition to complying with any system requirements, passwords must: (1) contain
mixed-cased and non-alphabetic characters, if possible; (2) be changed on a regular
basis and may not be a vendor-supplied password; and (3) may be known only by
authorized users.
Mobile phone and laptop wireless use right next to a machines? Why not? Who cares about bluetooth mesh or any of the numerous other types of security risks that can be introduced.
ARIZONA SECRETARY OF STATE
2019 ELECTIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL
Page | 96
CHAPTER 4:
5. Must be safeguarded from unauthorized access when being moved, transferred, serviced,
programmed, or temporarily stored;
Components of the electronic voting system:
1. Must be password-protected (for voting system software);
• In addition to complying with any system requirements, passwords must: (1) contain
mixed-cased and non-alphabetic characters, if possible; (2) be changed on a regular
basis and may not be a vendor-supplied password; and (3) may be known only by
authorized users.
16-625. Electronic data and digital images; ballots; security
The officer in charge of elections shall ensure that electronic data from and electronic or digital images of ballots are protected from physical and electronic access, including unauthorized copying or transfer, and that all security measures are at least as protective as those prescribed for paper ballots.
16-452. Rules; instructions and procedures manual; approval of manual; field check and review of systems; violation; classification
A. After consultation with each county board of supervisors or other officer in charge of elections, the secretary of state shall prescribe rules to achieve and maintain the maximum degree of correctness, impartiality, uniformity and efficiency on the procedures for early voting and voting, and of producing, distributing, collecting, counting, tabulating and storing ballots. The secretary of state shall also adopt rules regarding fax transmittal of unvoted ballots, ballot requests, voted ballots and other election materials to and from absent uniformed and overseas citizens and shall adopt rules regarding internet receipt of requests for federal postcard applications prescribed by section 16-543.
B. The rules shall be prescribed in an official instructions and procedures manual to be issued not later than December 31 of each odd-numbered year immediately preceding the general election. Before its issuance, the manual shall be approved by the governor and the attorney general. The secretary of state shall submit the manual to the governor and the attorney general not later than October 1 of the year before each general election.
C. A person who violates any rule adopted pursuant to this section is guilty of a class 2 misdemeanor.
D. The secretary of state shall provide personnel who are experts in electronic voting systems and procedures and in electronic voting system security to field check and review electronic voting systems and recommend needed statutory and procedural changes.
ARIZONA SECRETARY OF STATE
2019 ELECTIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL
Components of the electronic voting system:
1. Must be password-protected (for voting system software);
• In addition to complying with any system requirements, passwords must: (1) contain
mixed-cased and non-alphabetic characters, if possible; (2) be changed on a regular
basis and may not be a vendor-supplied password; and (3) may be known only by
authorized users.
Mobile phone and laptop wireless use right next to a machines? Why not? Who cares about bluetooth mesh or any of the numerous other types of security risks that can be introduced.
AZSOS Manual Pg 97-98 Chapter 4 states;
In addition, the following security protocols apply to any memory stick or removable electronic
storage device used with the electronic voting system:
1. A stick or device must be purchased or received from a reliable source.
2. A stick or device shall be permanently identified with a unique serial number or identifier
when in use, and an inventory of all electronic media shall be created and maintained.
3. Electronic storage media shall be physically secured at all times. No physical access should
be given to any person unless the election officer in charge of the electronic storage media
specifically grants that person access. Secured locations must be provided for storing
electronic media when not in use, coding an election, creating the election media, and
transferring and installing the election media into the voting device.
4. No electronic storage media shall be left unattended or in an unsecured location once it has
been coded for an election. Where applicable, coded election media shall be immediately
loaded into the relevant voting device, sealed, logged, and made secure or must be placed
in a secured and controlled environment and inventoried.
Must be sealed with tamper-resistant or tamper-evident seals once programmed;
• The seal number must be logged as corresponding with particular voting equipment
and the election media that has been sealed in the voting equipment. The log should be
preserved with the returns of the election. In the event of a recount or re-tally of votes,
the officer in charge of elections should be prepared to submit an affidavit confirming
that the election program and any election media used in the election have not been
altered. A.R.S. § 16-445(C).
From 2019 Election Procedure Manual: Must be witnessed by two or more election staff members (of different political parties if
possible) when being moved or transferred, which includes an inventory of the equipment
and chain of custody before and after the move or transfer.
4. Must be sealed with tamper-resistant or tamper-evident seals once programmed;
• The seal number must be logged as corresponding with particular voting equipment
and the election media that has been sealed in the voting equipment. The log should be
preserved with the returns of the election. In the event of a recount or re-tally of votes,
the officer in charge of elections should be prepared to submit an affidavit confirming
that the election program and any election media used in the election.....
Greetings Mr Richer and Board of Supervisors,
I came across this video and I find it strangely curious. Is it possible that this video features a County vehicle driven only around the secure parking lot? It seems to me this might make for an interesting set of FOIA requests. Where are these computers destined for and where did it come from? These clearly aren't new machines that were transported outside of sealed boxes in an open bed of what looks to be a personal pickup truck.
https://odysee.com/MCTEC-WB:b
In the private sector, audits are difficult and it is natural for you to feel uneasy before an audit begins. In the private sector you don't have the luxury use Twitter to cower and hide to avoid transparency https://twitter.com/maricopacounty/status/1416139688914526208?s=19.
In the private sector you must face challenge and scrutiny and do the hard work to ensure that the company you are working for is in compliance. In the public sector, or at least for Maricopa County, it seems that this is not the case. Through your perspective and subsequent actions, you have chosen to defame others on social media and hide from responsibility to voters. Imagine if that were possible if HHS auditors came to a company and the IT department behaved like Maricopa County. It's the voters who work for a living that are seeing a "rules for thee and not for me" attitude when it comes to their local government.
Maricopa County lost in court, yet act as if in complete denial of that loss. If the voters were the priority in all of this, Maricopa County would have been involved in the audit process. The fact is, egos have been the rule of the day at the expense of the voters. Another example of the tone deaf nature of this process is illustrated by the loss of voter cases in court. The people have been ridiculed in the media and many were blocked on social media. In contrast, Maricopa County loses in court and they attack vendors that assist the AZ State Senate, creating the same vile and vicious attack campaign. Completely unnecessary to do this, and in the interest of the voters the County could have accepted the loss and worked directly with the AZ State Senate. Instead, Maricopa County sets the example that if you lose in court, simply ignore the loss.
I demand that these questions be answered as soon as possible. I will release this video and message publicly and make it go viral if not answered honestly, respectfully, and in the interest of transparency. At some point Maricopa County will need to adopt some humility and realize that these images do not engender trust in its capabilities to ethically run elections.
Where did these systems come from?
Why are they being transported unsealed?
Why is this driver alone?
Is there GPS accountability of the trip?
Did this person stop anywhere along the transit? How is it known that he didn't stop at a Circle K for a cold drink?
If any stops were made how do you ensure that the cargo had not been tampered with?
Are there public cameras at the location where the systems are stored? If not, why not, since the tabulation center has them?
How can we assure that these systems were not used during the election in 2020 to run a phantom election or otherwise tampered with?
Why aren't serial numbers validated on departure and arrival?
Is it Maricopa County's perception that this is a good look? Was this an intentional setup for more Twitter childishness?
I look forward to quick responses to the questions posed. Please conduct yourselves ethically - that includes refraining from personal attacks on other parties via Twitter and other media sources as certainly none of you is above reproach. Your positions are all in service to the voters of Maricopa County, myself included, and we all deserve your professional conduct, at the minimum.
Thank you for your attention
—— No answer
Sent to:
steve.chucri@maricopa.gov
sricher@risc.maricopa.gov
jack.sellers@maricopa.gov
bill.gates@maricopa.gov
clint.hickman@maricopa.gov
khobbs@azsos.gov