1-27-23-third-day-of-trial-pt-1
San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 US 522 - Supreme Court 1987
Most fundamentally, this Court has held that a government "normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the [government]." Blum v. Yaretsky, supra, at 1004; Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, supra, at 840. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U. S. 149, 166 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., supra, at 357; Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163, 173 (1972); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 170 (1970).
Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F. 3d 557 - Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit 1999
Title III of the Act, in section 302(a), provides that "no individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability 559*559 in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation" by the owner, lessee, or operator of such a place. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). The core meaning of this provision, plainly enough, is that the owner or operator of a store, hotel, restaurant, dentist's office, travel agency, theater, Web site, or other facility (whether in physical space or in electronic space, Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir.1994)) that is open to the public cannot exclude disabled persons from entering the facility and, once in, from using the facility in the same way that the nondisabled do. The owner or operator of, say, a camera store can neither bar the door to the disabled nor let them in but then refuse to sell its cameras to them on the same terms as to other customers. E.g., Johnson v. Gambrinus Co./Spoetzl Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052 (5th Cir.1997); Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C.Cir. 1997); Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Title III Technical Assistance Manual § III-3.2000 (Nov.1993); 28 C.F.R. § 36.202.
Georgia v. Rachel, 384 US 780 - Supreme Court 1966
Mr. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, however, as Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U. S. 306, made clear, protects those who refuse to obey such an order not only from conviction in state courts, but from prosecution in those courts. Hamm emphasized the precise terms of § 203 (c) that prohibit any "attempt to punish" persons for exercising rights of equality conferred upon them by the Act. The 805*805 explicit terms of that section compelled the conclusion that "nonforcible attempts to gain admittance to or remain in establishments covered by the Act, are immunized from prosecution . . . ." 379 U. S., at 311. The 1964 Act therefore "substitutes a right for a crime." 379 U. S., at 314.
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It is no answer in these circumstances that the defendants might eventually prevail in the state court.[30] The burden of having to defend the prosecutions is itself the denial of a right explicitly conferred by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as construed in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, supra.
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MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE FORTAS join, concurring.
As I indicate in my opinion in the Peacock cases, post, p. 842, equal civil rights of a citizen of the United States are "denied" within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1443 (1) (1964 ed.) when he is prosecuted for asserting them. Section 201 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (78 Stat. 243, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a (1964 ed.)) gave these defendants a right to equal service in places of public accommodation. Section 203 (78 Stat. 244, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a-2 (1964 ed.)) gave them a right against intimidation, coercion, or punishment for exercising those rights. And we held in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U. S. 306, that §§ 201 and 203 precluded state criminal trespass convictions of sit-in demonstrators even though the sit-ins occurred 807*807 and their prosecution had been instituted prior to the effective date of the 1964 Act.
Congress, in other words, gave these defendants the right to enter the restaurants in question, to sit there, and to be served—a right that was construed by this Court to include immunity from prosecution after the effective date of the Act for acts done prior thereto.
It is the right to equal service in restaurants and the right to be free of prosecution for asserting that right— not the right to have a trespass conviction reversed—that the present prosecutions threaten. It is this right which must be vindicated by complete insulation from the State's criminal process if it is to be wholly vindicated. It is this right which the defendants are "denied" so long as the present prosecutions persist.
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