Chapter 7 – Conclusion - A GEOSTRATEGY FOR EURASIA - A TRANS-EURASIAN SECURITY SYSTEM - BEYOND THE LAST GLOBAL SUPERPOWER Here is the second edition of a well-known text on how the United States should interact in diplomacy with the nations of the Eurasian continent. Link: https://www.amazon.com/-/de/dp/046509435X Support the channel: ? Paypal: https://paypal.me/mario1337 ? BTC: 35iDtUzZq33CoJhmK38TdV9Xunvs7TKmzX ? ETH: 0xf396A0e10911b4BC975CfE80117412D484B24d1e ▶️Twitter: https://twitter.com/Freiheitsloewe ▶️Odysee: https://odysee.com/@EugenRichterAudiobooks:2 ▶️Rumble: https://rumble.com/c/c-1940805 As the twentieth century draws to a close, the United States has emerged as the world's only superpower: no other nation possesses comparable military and economic power or has interests that bestride the globe. Yet the critical question facing America remains unanswered: What should be the nation's global strategy for maintaining its exceptional position in the world? Zbigniew Brzezinski tackles this question head-on in this incisive and pathbreaking book.The Grand Chessboard presents Brzezinski's bold and provocative geostrategic vision for American preeminence in the twenty-first century. Central to his analysis is the exercise of power on the Eurasian landmass, which is home to the greatest part of the globe's population, natural resources, and economic activity. Stretching from Portugal to the Bering Strait, from Lapland to Malaysia, Eurasia is the "grand chessboard" on which America's supremacy will be ratified and challenged in the years to come. The task facing the United States, he argues, is to manage the conflicts and relationships in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East so that no rival superpower arises to threaten our interests or our well-being.The heart of The Grand Chessboard is Brzezinski's analysis of the four critical regions of Eurasia and of the stakes for America in each arena--Europe, Russia, Central Asia, and East Asia. The crucial fault lines may seem familiar, but the implosion of the Soviet Union has created new rivalries and new relationships, and Brzezinski maps out the strategic ramifications of the new geopolitical realities. He explains, for example: Why France and Germany will play pivotal geostrategic roles, whereas Britain and Japan will not. Why NATO expansion offers Russia the chance to undo the mistakes of the past, and why Russia cannot afford to toss this opportunity aside. Why the fate of Ukraine and Azerbaijan are so important to America. Why viewing China as a menace is likely to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Sources 31 A strong case for this initiative, pointing out the mutual economic benefits thereof, is made by Kurt Tong, “Revolutionizing America’s Japan Policy,” Foreign Policy (Winter 1996–1997). 32 A number of constructive proposals to that end were advanced at the CSIS (Center for International and Strategic Studies) Conference on America and Europe, held in Brussels in February 1997. They ranged from joint efforts at structural reform, designed to reduce government deficits, to the development of an enhanced European defense industrial base, which would enhance transatlantic defense collaboration and a greater European role in NATO. A useful list of similar and other initiatives, meant to generate a greater European role, is contained in David C. Gompert and F. Stephen Larrabee, eds., America and Europe: A Partnership for a New Era (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1997). 33 It is appropriate to quote here the wise advice offered by my colleague at CSIS, Anthony H. Cordesman (in his paper on “The American Threat to the United States,” February 1997, p. 16, delivered as a speech to the Army War College), who has warned against the American propensity to demonize issues and even nations. As he put it: “Iran, Iraq, and Libya are cases where the U.S. has taken hostile regimes that pose real, but limited threats and ‘demonized’ them without developing any workable mid- to long-term end game for its strategy. U.S. planners cannot hope to totally isolate these states, and it makes no sense to treat them as if they were identical ‘rogue’ or ‘terrorist’ states.... The U.S. lives in a morally gray world and cannot succeed by trying to make it black and white.” 34 “An Emerging Consensus—A Study of American Public Attitudes on America’s Role in the World” (College Park: Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, July 1996). It is noteworthy, but not inconsistent with the foregoing, that studies by the above center, conducted in early 1997 (under principal investigator Steven Kull), also showed a considerable majority in favor of NATO expansion (62 percent in favor, with 27 percent strongly in favor; and only 29 percent against, with 14 percent strongly against). 35 Hans Kohn. The Twentieth Century (New York: 1949), p. 53. #geopolitics #history #foreignpolicy ... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ml-FcD06gXs

Support: paypal.me/mario1337 BTC: 35iDtUzZq33CoJhmK38TdV9Xunvs7TKmzX ETH: 0xf396A0e10911b4BC975CfE80117412D484B24d1e Chapter 5 from Battles Lost and Won by Hanson Baldwin. In Battles Lost & Won: Great Campaigns of World War II, military editor and analyst of the New York Times, Hanson Baldwin evaluates eleven crucial battles, describing what happened in each and why. In the words of the author, "each [of these battles] was an entity; many were a turning point; upon some the scales of history rested." The battles analyzed are the Polish campaign, the battle of Britain, the invasion of Crete, the fall of Corregidor, Stalingrad, the Sicilian campaign, Tarawa, the invasion of Normandy, Leyte Gulf, the battle of the Bulge and Okinawa. https://www.amazon.com/-/de/dp/1568520107 ... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uz_SlyLbKPk